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Conspiracy theories seem to play an increasing role in public political 
discourse. This development is problematic for a variety of reasons, most 
importantly because widespread belief in conspiracy theories will under-
mine the institutions of open societies. One of the central questions that 
will need to be answered here if we hope to fi nd out why conspirational 
thought is recently gaining such support and to fi nd out how to respond 
to it, is the following: what mindset leads to the belief in conspiracy theo-
ries? People who believe in conspiracy theories are often ridiculed as nut-
cases, tinfoil hats, and paranoid crackpots, while they portray themselves 
as particularly critical, better informed and enlightened responsible citi-
zens. Finding out which of these characterizations is correct is crucial 
for coming up with the appropriate response to the rise of conspirational 
thought. In this article, I want to discuss this question and the phenom-
enon of conspirational thought in two respects. First, I want to explain 
how philosophy, and epistemology in particular, is essential for under-
standing the phenomenon and for developing a strategy to deal with the 
harmful kind of conspirational thought. Secondly, I want to show how 
epistemology in turn can learn from studying this phenomenon.
Keywords: Social epistemology, conspiracies theories, normativity 
of rationality, epistemic authority, conspiracy theory of society.
1. Introduction
It surely feels as if conspiracy theories and conspirational thought are 
at an unprecedented high. A quick glance into the comment section of 
almost any topic at almost any online news outlet will acquaint you 
with a wide range of conspiracy theories, from the moderately suspi-
cious to the outright bizarre.
Indeed, it seems that almost any recent event is the result of a con-
spiracy. 9/11 was an inside job, Obama’s birth certifi cate is a forgery, 
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global warming is a major hoax. Malaysia Airlines Flight 370 has been 
abducted by the Unites States, Malaysia Airlines Flight 17 has been 
shot down by a Ukrainian fi ghter jet in a failed attempt to assassinate 
Vladimir Putin. Refugees are let in masses to enter the EU as part of 
a large conspiracy that tries to abolish nation states and install the 
New World Order. The Clintons are members of a child sex ring that 
operates from a Washington D.C. pizza place. The Paris terror strikes 
of 2015 were in fact another inside job, while the terror attack on a 
Christmas Market in Berlin last winter did not actually kill anyone—
with the exception of the alleged terrorist—but was just entirely staged 
by the German government.1
For all we know, these theories are false. More importantly, some of 
them are simply absurd. Can’t we then just shrug the rise of conspiracy 
theories off as an insignifi cant—and perhaps even somewhat entertain-
ing—cultural development that is largely due to the fact that—thanks 
to the internet—nerdy crackpots have it now very easy when they want 
to disseminate their crazy views?
Well, I don’t think that we can just shrug it off. On the one hand, 
conspiracy theories, of the kind just listed, aren’t harmless. As I said, 
for all we know, they are false. So, people who believe these theories be-
lieve something false, and might—because of that—make poor choices. 
They might end up voting for the wrong party, or oppose important 
policies, they might not vaccinate their children, might not be willing to 
contribute to efforts intended to prevent global warming, and so forth. 
And these are still only the moderate negative consequences. On 
December 4 of 2016, 28-year-old Edgar Maddison Welch took his as-
sault rifl e and a revolver and drove from Salisbury to the pizza restau-
rant “Comet Pingpong” in Washington D.C. in order to investigate him-
self whether the restaurant indeed houses a sex ring of child abusers 
(as it was claimed in the “pizzagate” conspiracy theory). He did fi re his 
gun there, fortunately not hurting anyone, and, of course, found noth-
ing. So, one reason for being worried about the rise of conspirational 
thought should be that it leads to false beliefs.
False conspiracy theories are also harmful to those not believing 
them. Scientists, offi cials and journalists will have to spend their valu-
able time debunking false allegations. This debunking is enormously 
complicated by the fact that the false theory one is trying to debunk is a 
conspiracy theory. All the evidence one can produce against the conspir-
acy theory is just too easily interpreted in the light of that very theory as 
simply being further smokescreen produced by the conspirators.
Finally, conspiracy theories are not only a symptom of a receding 
trust in expertise, science, and the government, but the propagation 
of these theories further nourishes this distrust. This development 
1 All claims about the content of particular conspiracy theories in this essay can 
be verifi ed via the relevant Wikipedia entries. These entries also contain links to 
websites providing more information.
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undermines these institutions. In a society in which universities and 
experts aren’t trusted anyway, few will protest when universities are 
closed and research funding is cut.
So, these theories aren’t harmless. But their support isn’t marginal 
either, it isn’t confi ned to “middle-aged white male Internet enthusi-
asts who live in their mother’s basements” (Uscinski and Parent 2014: 
5). As polls in the United States show, “conspiracy theories permeate 
all parts of American society and cut across gender, age, race, income, 
political affi liation, educational level, and occupational status” (Uscin-
ski and Parent 2014: 5).
The political relevance of this phenomenon is also apparent in Eu-
rope. ‘Lügenpresse’ (lying press) has become famous as the fi ghting 
word of the self-proclaimed “critical citizens” that support PEGIDA or 
the AfD in Germany. Essentially, the background of the “Lügenpresse” 
allegation is just a conspiracy theory, according to which the left and 
liberal mainstream media are collaborating with the German govern-
ment in its evil plan to destroy Germany with an infl ux of immigrants.
This all is surely reason enough to take the apparent rise of conspi-
rational thought seriously and to inquire into its origin. Many social 
scientists, psychologists, historians, and a somewhat smaller group of 
philosophers have thus looked into that issue in the past few years.
One of the central questions that will need to be answered here 
if we hope to fi nd out why conspirational thought is recently gaining 
such support and to fi nd out how to respond to it, is the following: what 
mindset leads to the belief in conspiracy theories? People who belief in 
conspiracy theories are often ridiculed as nutcases, tinfoil hats, and 
paranoid crackpots, while they portray themselves as particularly criti-
cal, better informed and enlightened responsible citizens. Finding out 
which of these characterizations is correct is crucial for coming up with 
the appropriate response to the rise of conspirational thought. Is the 
best response logic and argumentation or is it therapy and medication? 
In this essay I want to discuss this question and the phenomenon 
of conspirational thought in two respects. First, I want to explain how 
philosophy, and epistemology in particular, is essential for understand-
ing the phenomenon and for developing a strategy to deal with the 
harmful kind of conspirational thought. Secondly, I want to show how 
epistemology in turn can learn from studying this phenomenon. Along 
the way, I hope it becomes clear that I see the analysis of conspiracy 
theories, its current popularity and its cure a matter that requires in-
terdisciplinary effort.
2. What Can Philosophy Contribute?
So let’s begin with the question how philosophy can contribute. That 
philosophy can contribute might not be obvious. Sociology and psychol-
ogy might prima facie be seen as the most relevant disciplines to ex-
plain the phenomenon of the rise of conspirational thought and the 
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questions of whether its proponents are nutcases or sane critical citi-
zens.
2.1. The Sociology of Conspiracy Theories
Let us consider sociology fi rst. Conspiracies themselves are a social 
phenomenon. Under which conditions they can form, be sustainable 
and successful is an issue that social scientists are best placed to in-
vestigate. It is also a matter of sociology to inquire who (i.e. what type) 
develops theories about conspiracies and how these theories get dis-
seminated to wider audiences and come to be infl uential for public 
discourse. The latter is the social study of—what might be called—
“conspiracy culture” (Aupers 2012).
Some sociologists believe that the study of such cultures should 
abstain from any normative judgments about the rationality or accu-
racy of the beliefs that are held and sustained in these cultures. In 
the literature on conspiracy theories I found this view motivated from 
either Max Weber’s considerations for a value-free science, or by Da-
vid Bloor’s conception of the so-called strong programme (e.g., Haram-
bam (2017) cites both motivations as a motivation to refrain from any 
normative judgments). But also sociologists who do not shy away from 
taking a normative stance are not terribly helpful in identifying what 
if anything is wrong with conspiracy theorists. Joseph Uscinski and 
Joseph Parent, for example, in fact try to identify standards by which 
one is supposed to measure how likely it is that a given conspiracy 
theory is true (Uscinski and Parent 2014). However, these consider-
ations then play no role whatsoever in their sociological analysis of how 
widespread conspiracy beliefs are in the American public.
Clearly, the social sciences can tell us a good deal about certain de-
scriptive matters. Like, for example, under what conditions conspiracy 
theories are likely to spread, and what type of people typically ends up 
believing these. The great value of the analysis by Uscinski and Par-
ent, for example, lies in the observation that conspirational thought in 
the US, although also there it seems to many to be on the rise, is actu-
ally over the past decades in decline.
They also found, as already reported above, that belief in conspira-
cies is not confi ned to specifi c demographics in the US. Moreover, they 
found that the public impact of a conspiracy theory very much depends 
on who’s in the White House. Under democratic presidents, more 
people believe that communists are the conspirators, under republi-
can presidents more people believe that it’s capitalists who conspire 
against the American public. Of course, in 2014 Uscinski and Parent 
couldn’t foresee that in 2017 a president would be in the White House 
who himself propagates conspiracy theories.
Another sociological fi nd, that seems to be quite robust, is the fact 
that conspiracy theories often lead to more conspiracy theories. That 
is, if someone starts to believe that 9/11 was an inside job, such person 
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will often also believe in other conspiracies, such as the idea that vac-
cinations cause autism, or that climate change is a hoax or that the 
holocaust didn’t happen. Moreover, it seems that there doesn’t need to 
be any coherence between these theories, other than that they explain 
events in terms of a conspiracy (Sutton and Douglas 2014).
As we will see below, such observations are crucial in order to un-
derstand the rise of conspirational thought in a society, but by itself 
they don’t answer the question to what degree (if any) conspiracy theo-
ries are rationally believed. For that latter question, the social sciences 
do not provide the necessary expertise.
2.2. The Psychology of Conspiracy Theories
One might perhaps think that psychology is better equipped to deal 
with that latter problem. Psychology informs us about our unconscious 
biases and the quick and dirty heuristic that our mind uses to generate 
solutions to problems that would sometimes better be tackled by care-
ful refl ection. Psychology also informs us about character traits and 
personality profi les, all of which can then be correlated with certain 
types of beliefs. For example, a prominent explanation for why some 
people might be prone to believe in conspiracy theories is that they 
have a hypersensitive module for agency detection.
Hypersensitive agency detection is considered a cognitive bias that 
came about as an adaptation.
[S]ince humans have evolved in an environment that contains many agents 
(e.g., friends, enemies and dangerous predatory animals) hypersensitivity 
to agency may be adaptive because it makes people wary in their inter-
actions with the environment around them, reducing vulnerability to un-
expected outcomes and avoiding risk from potentially dangerous factors. 
Being able to detect and understand an event and react quickly, or respond 
quickly to an ambiguous situation, is important for physical and social sur-
vival. (Douglas et al. 2016: 60)
While taking a stroll through the park, you hear a noise in a nearby 
bush or tree, and you spontaneously form the belief that someone or 
some animal is hiding there, while perhaps the sound just came from 
the wind stirring up some leafs. Hypersensitive agency detection means 
that you sometimes suspect agency when in fact there is none. Having 
a reaction of that kind might still have been overall better for survival 
even if it sometimes leads to mistaken assumptions of agents in your 
environment. As so often, it’s better to be safe than sorry. The fact that 
we have this hypersensitivity to agency has been cited to explain why 
humans believe in the existence of invisible spirits and gods, why we 
are superstitious and belief in causal connections among unconnected 
events, etc.
Obviously, to overascribe agency and intentionality and to see pur-
poses and causal connections where there are none is typical for false 
conspiracy theories. Thus, plausibly, people that tend to overascribe 
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agency might also be prone to believe in conspiracies. As Douglas and 
colleagues have shown in their (Douglas et al. 2016) this is indeed the 
case. They found that a low level of education predicts endorsement of 
conspiracy theories, which is mediated by a general tendency to over-
attribute intentional agency. Thus, some people end up believing in 
conspiracies because of a certain thinking style that involves hypersen-
sitivity to agency.
Again, this is a very valuable and interesting result, but whether 
this is going to help in understanding how we should respond to the 
apparent rise in conspirational thought is still a question that is itself 
left open by these psychological results. Is it sometimes rational to be-
lieve in a conspiracy theory? If it is not rational to believe in such the-
ory then the existence of a hypersensitive module for agency detection 
could explain why some people nevertheless believe in such theories. 
But the psychological result is silent on that question. We learn that 
low educational level predicts belief in conspiracies. But whether you 
believe a theory rationally is often a matter of your background knowl-
edge, a matter of the evidence that you have for the theory and the al-
ternative explanations that you are aware of. Perhaps people who lack 
certain levels of education lack the background knowledge that would 
make their belief irrational. In order to understand better whether it 
is at all possible to believe rationally in a conspiracy theory, we should 
eventually turn to philosophy.
2.3. The Philosophy of Conspiracy Theories
Theoretical philosophy deals in several areas with the kind of norma-
tive questions we are here seeking answers to. In logic we investigate 
the logical correctness of reasoning and argumentation, in epistemology 
theoretical philosophers investigate the conditions under which we can 
have knowledge of the world around us, and in philosophy of science, 
we look at the questions of when theories are supported by evidence, 
what criteria an explanation needs to satisfy in order to be a good sci-
entifi c explanation, and how scientists should go about testing and re-
vising their theoretical accounts of the world. This is precisely the kind 
of expertise that seems relevant for answering the question when—if 
ever—it might be rational to believe a conspiracy theory. So let us see 
what theoretical philosophy has to say about conspiracy theories.
The philosophical engagement with conspiracy theories is still rela-
tively young and—unfortunately—as yet not very developed. It is often 
(e.g. Pigden (1995), Coady (2012)) claimed that Karl Popper was the 
fi rst to write about it in his famous opus magnum The Open Society and 
its Enemies in 1945 (Popper 1945).
Popper’s theory is supposed to be that conspiracy theorists must 
believe that every event is due to intentional successful planning and 
Popper holds against this view that it overlooks the fact that many if 
not most of the consequences of our actions are not in fact under our 
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control. Very often events happen as unintended consequences of our 
actions. Hence conspiracy theories are irrational, because they rest on 
an untenable assumption concerning the amount by which we have 
control over the consequences of our actions. If many or most of these 
consequences are not intended, then it can’t be true that all events are 
the product of successful intentional planning.
People who understand Popper as making this argument have been 
quick to point out that Popper’s critique of conspiracy theories can’t be 
right. Why should every conspiracy theorist assume that all events are 
the result of successful intentional planning? After all, conspiracy theo-
ries are typically theories of specifi c outcomes, for example the collapse 
of the World Trade Center, or the death of Lady Di. Why should con-
spiracy theorists then have to believe that all events that happen were 
so planned? And, clearly, sometimes events do come out as planned, so 
how is Popper’s argument supposed to work?
I believe that this controversy is due to a misunderstanding of Pop-
per’s writings. Popper is not in fact engaging with conspiracy theories 
in the way in which we are interested in them here. Popper is instead 
trying to make a quite valid methodological point about the social sci-
ences in general. When he talks about the “conspiracy theory of society” 
he has sociologists in mind who think that the social sciences work by 
providing intentional explanations of social events.
A theory of the type Popper has in mind here, is—what he calls—
Vulgar Marxism, the idea that social events are to be explained by iden-
tifying the social class-related motives of the protagonists that brought 
an event about, and to explain the event, in turn, as the intended sat-
isfaction of these class-related motives. But that’s not a theory or a 
criticism of conspiracy theories as such.
So Popper didn’t believe that all conspiracy theories rest on that 
one mistaken premise that all conspiracy theorists must believe that 
all events are due to a conspiracy. Nevertheless, this is a “type” of view 
that one can indeed fi nd in the philosophical literature. There are sev-
eral attempts to show that belief in conspiracy theories rests on some 
fundamental mistake, such that it is always or almost always irratio-
nal to believe such a theory, just because it is a conspiracy theory.
This is certainly somewhat in line with the ordinary use of the word 
‘conspiracy theory’. To call a theory a “conspiracy theory”, or someone 
a “conspiracy theorist” is often intended in a derogatory way. Wonder-
ing whether conspiracy theories are irrational—in that usage—makes 
no sense; of course, they are. This usage is so widely spread that con-
spiracy theorists themselves want to avoid the label. For example, you 
fi nd YouTube videos on one of the paradigmatic conspiracy theories, 
the chemtrails theory, that are titled “Chemtrails are not a conspiracy 
theory”.
If that’s so, then perhaps we should defi ne ‘conspiracy theory’ right 
away as a certain type of irrational belief. So, perhaps a conspiracy 
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theory is an irrationally believed theory that explains an event as the re-
sult of a conspiracy. The problem with such defi nition is that it doesn’t 
relate to the psychological and sociological research on conspiracy theo-
ries. Most of that research tries to correlate belief in certain specifi c 
explanations—for example the theory that 9/11 was an inside job, or 
that Oswald didn’t act alone—with a demographic or psychological pro-
fi le. But this correlation will hold between this profi le and conspiracy 
theories as defi ned in the proposed defi nition only if these theories are 
irrationally believed by the people that participate in that study. But 
these studies typically do not investigate on what evidence or with 
which justifi cation these theories are believed (as we have seen above 
in the discussion of whether a hypersensitive agency detection module 
can explain belief in conspiracy theories).
The trick to close this gap is not to defi ne conspiracy theory outright 
as an irrationally believed explanation of some event, but to show that 
conspiracy theories can only be believed in an irrational way.
It seems that what we’d need in order to draw immediate conse-
quences from the empirical results of psychology and sociology is a 
critical analysis of conspiracy theories that resembles in result David 
Hume’s critical analysis of miracles. In section X of his Enquiry David 
Hume makes the following argument:
A miracle is a violation of the laws of nature; and as a fi rm and unalterable 
experience has established these laws, the proof against a miracle, from the 
very nature of the fact, is as entire as any argument from experience can 
possibly be imagined. (Hume 1748)
Hume defi nes a miracle as a violation of the laws of nature. Thus, to 
recognize something as a miracle is to recognize it as a violation of the 
laws of nature. But that means that we must have had strong em-
pirical evidence to believe the law in the fi rst place, which the miracle 
supposedly violates. Which means in turn, so Hume’s reasoning, that 
whatever evidence we think we have for the proposed miraculous event 
is simply outweighed by the evidence that speaks against it—it is far 
more likely that we are not dealing with a miracle but with a mis-
taken or misleading observation report. Consequently, believing that a 
miracle has occurred is always irrational. This analysis rests on a con-
ceptual and an empirical component. The conceptual component is the 
defi nition of a miracle as a violation of the laws of nature. The empiri-
cal component of the argument is human fallibility, and the fact that 
miracles are never observed by suffi ciently many in order to outweigh 
the evidence against them.
Hume’s argument is controversial, but my point is independent of 
whether Hume is right about miracles. I just want to explain by that 
analogy that if we had such an analysis for conspiracy theories as Hume 
offers for miracles, we could immediately answer our initial question: 
conspiracy theorists must be paranoid nutcases, because there is no ra-
tional way to believe such a theory (just as—according to Hume—there 
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is no rational way to believe in miracles). Also, sociological and psy-
chological research into the correlation between, say, cognitive biases 
and conspiracy belief, would then directly tell us something about the 
causes of these beliefs.
Alas, I don’t quite see how such a Humean analysis could be 
achieved, at least not on conceptual considerations alone. Such “con-
ceptual considerations” of course depend on the defi nition one presup-
poses for the term ‘conspiracy theory’. We have seen above that such a 
defi nition should—at least for our purposes—not include explicitly that 
any believe in such theory is irrational.
But what is a conspiracy theory then? First of all, it is an explana-
tion for sometimes an event, sometimes just some other kind of phe-
nomenon. For example, the inside job conspiracy theory of 9/11 explains 
as an event the collapse of the World Trade Center, and the theory that 
Diana, Princess of Wales, was killed by MI6 explains as an event the 
car crash in a tunnel in Paris in August 1997. As in these cases, the 
events in question are often tragic or even traumatic, and believing 
that they were the results of malicious intentional planning might be a 
form of psychological coping with the tragedy.
However, not every conspiracy theory explains a traumatic event. 
For example, the chemtrails conspiracy theory holds that long-lasting 
trails, so-called “chemtrails”, are left in the sky by high-fl ying aircraft 
and that they consist of chemical or biological agents deliberately 
sprayed for purposes undisclosed to the general public. So, this theory 
explains the durability of the condensation trails of planes.
In the introduction, I already mentioned the pizzagate conspiracy 
theory. This theory developed quickly after WikiLeaks released emails 
that were hacked from the account of John Podesta, the chairman of 
Hilary Clinton’s campaign in the presidential elections of 2016. The 
publication of these emails occurred just a month before the election. 
The emails where then discussed on social media and a few Trump sup-
porting platforms. At some point, it was suggested that the occasional 
reference to pizza and to meetings at Washington restaurants were in 
fact secret code for child pornography (allegedly, ‘cheese pizza’ with the 
initials ‘c’ and ‘p’ is code for ‘child pornography’). Under this new inter-
pretation, seemingly innocent and unconnected emails about dinner 
invites were quickly revealed to be in fact hiding a child sex ring that 
the Clintons and the Podesta brothers were a central part of, and that 
operated from the restaurant “Comet Pingpong” in Washington D.C. In 
the case of the pizzagate conspiracy theory, there is no specifi c event 
or even tangible phenomenon that gets explained. Instead, the theory 
explains why John Podesta exchanged emails that contained reference 
to pizza and dinners at restaurants.
So far, we know that conspiracy theories are explanations of a cer-
tain kind that explain something. What makes these explanations now 
conspiracy theories is that they invoke secretly conspiring agents as a 
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salient cause in the explanation. The reasons why these agents are con-
spiring secretly can be several. Often it is assumed that the conspirators 
are not up for anything good. They have malicious, evil plans, that would 
meet with heavy resistance if the public were to learn about them.
But the maliciousness of the intentions behind the conspiracy are 
not a necessary ingredient of conspiracy theories, even if one restricts 
the analysis to the paradigmatic cases. First of all, some conspiracy 
theories remain agnostic about the intentions that are behind the con-
spiracy. For example, a prominent German authority on the chemtrails 
conspiracy theory expresses in interviews that he does not know what 
exactly the chemtrails contain and what they are good for, and that it 
is conceivable that they are supposed to serve some benefi cial purpose.
A clearer example is perhaps the theory that Paul McCartney died 
in a car crash already in November 1966. According to that theory, 
Paul drove off after an argument with the other band members during 
a recording session, crashed his car and died. He was then replaced 
by a certain “William Campbell” who had previously won a Paul Mc-
Cartney lookalike contest. William Campbell is in conspiracy circles 
referred to as “Faul McCartney”.
The theory is extremely elaborate and there are hundreds of clues 
found that are supposed to support it. At fi rst, the theory is supposed to 
explain why the Beatles for some time after Paul’s death did not appear 
in public together. Since Faul McCartney is supposed to be taller than 
Paul, they also didn’t play many live concerts anymore with the new 
line-up (so people wouldn’t notice the difference in height between Paul 
and Faul). But the band also left clues for their fans, since they couldn’t 
quite keep that secret for themselves. Most prominently, the cover of 
the Beatle’s Abbey Road record, which displays, according to the con-
spiracy theorists, a funeral procession. Lennon in white is the priest, 
Starr symbolizes the undertaker, Harrison, in denim is the gravedig-
ger, and Faul, fi nally, out of step with the others and barefooted is the 
supposed.
The theory is also confi rmed by several backside messages that the 
Beatles allegedly hid in their songs, and it explains the complex sym-
bolism of the cover of the Sgt. Pepper’s Lonely Hearts Club Band (1967), 
which supposedly represents the funeral of Paul McCartney.
According to most versions of that theory that I came across, the 
band, the management and the media together conspired to hide the 
death of Paul McCartney from the public. But the intentions behind it 
were not primarily sinister. Most theorists seem to hold that the death 
of McCartney was covered up to spare the public from grief. The Bea-
tles were so popular at the time that it would have been a catastrophe 
for the fans to learn that their idol had died.
Also, according to the conspiracy theory, the cover-up had an alto-
gether positive side effect; Faul is supposedly more talented than Paul 
McCartney and the music of the Beatles improved after Paul’s death.
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Thus, sinister motives are often assumed to be the reason for the 
agents acting in secrecy, but it isn’t a defi ning feature of a conspiracy 
theory.
Some defi nitions of conspiracy theories have a problem with the se-
crecy condition. It is clear that conspirators intend to act in secrecy. 
But can a theory still be a conspiracy theory if the secret conspiracy has 
been leaked by, for example, a whistleblower? Once something is out in 
the open such that others are aware of it, it isn’t anymore a secret, but 
isn’t being secret a defi ning feature of conspiracy theories?2
Again, this seems to be a confusion. Otherwise everyone who sin-
cerely proposes a conspiracy theory would thereby undermine it. Con-
spiracy theories couldn’t be rationally believed, because they—liter-
ally—couldn’t be believed. Obviously, the secrecy requirement just 
means that the conspirators intend to act and coordinate secretly.
Another feature that has been suggested as a defi ning feature of 
conspiracy theories is the fact that they are often in confl ict with the 
“offi cial story”. On that view, the offi cial explanation of the collapse of 
9/11, namely that it is due to a conspiracy between members of the ter-
ror network Al-Kaida, is not a conspiracy theory, while the theory that 
the collapse is due to a conspiracy in the US government is a conspiracy 
theory.
There are two problems with this requirement that a conspiracy 
theory always has to be in confl ict with the offi cial story. One is that 
what counts as “the offi cial story” is context dependent. Russian mass 
media came up with several explanations of the crash of Malaysian 
Airlines Flight 17 that confl icted with the explanation that the Dutch 
Safety Board and the Dutch-led Joint Investigation Team provided. 
According to the story that was in Russia considered to be the offi cial 
account, the Ukrainian army was to blame, while the offi cial story rec-
ognized in the Netherlands holds that the plane was shot down by a 
missile that was fi red from a rebel-controlled area. Which of these theo-
ries is a conspiracy theory and which is not doesn’t depend on whether 
you are in Russia or in the Netherlands.
Another, related problem is that a conspiracy theory doesn’t cease to 
be such if its proponents come to power. On April 10, 2010, an aircraft 
of the Polish Air force with several Polish government offi cials on board 
crashed near the city of Smolensk in Russia. For some time, the offi cial 
story according to Polish and Russian investigators was that the plane 
crashed because of an unsafe landing approach in the bad weather con-
ditions of that day. In 2015 the political party “Law and Justice” won 
the Polish parliamentary elections; the leader of that party, Jaroslaw 
Kaczyński believes that the crash is due to an assassination—possibly 
orchestrated by Russia—and the investigation of the crash has since 
been reopened. What used to be a conspiracy theory in confl ict with the 
offi cial account is ince 2015 a story supported by offi cials.
2 See Räikkä (2009) and Mandik (2007).
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Likewise, the fact that in 2017 it is the current president of the 
United States, Donald Trump, who publishes on Twitter that his pre-
decessor, Barack Obama ordered to wiretap his phones during the elec-
tion campaign, doesn’t make the wiretapping story any less of a con-
spiracy theory. So, again, being in confl ict with the offi cial story is not a 
defi ning element for a conspiracy theory.
But then we arrive at a rather thin defi nition of the term ‘conspiracy 
theory’:
Defi nition. A conspiracy theory is an explanation that cites agents act-
ing together in secrecy as a salient cause.
This defi nition is thin, which means that it is also quite broad.3 The of-
fi cial explanation that 9/11 was the result of a secret plot by Al-Quaeda 
terrorists is a conspiracy theory just as much as the theory that it was 
an inside job. But since we left out sinister motives from the defi nition, 
also your suspicion that your friends may be planning a surprise birth-
day party for you, is a conspiracy theory.
But because the defi nition is that broad, we also know immediately 
that conspiracy theories in this sense can be rationally believed. In fact, 
all of us believe several conspiracy theories. In other words, a general 
argument that could show that conspiracy theories are always irratio-
nal to believe and that would just fall out of a defi nition of ‘conspiracy 
theory’ is not forthcoming. The kind of argument that Hume produced 
against miracles cannot be produced against conspiracy theories.
3. What is wrong with conspiracy theories? 
But that means that a lot more work needs to be done, both on the side 
of philosophy and on the side of sociology and psychology to understand 
what goes wrong with conspiracy theories when they go wrong.
Now, of course, often conspiracy theories will be bad explanations of 
an event for familiar reasons. Familiar in the sense that philosophers 
of science have already identifi ed such reasons. For example, one ex-
planation of an event might be worse than an alternative explanation 
of that same event if it can explain less aspects of the event, if it is 
less supported by the empirical evidence gathered about the event, if it 
needs to postulate a greater number of unlikely events, etc.
Also, theorists who fall for these inferior explanations might make 
familiar mistakes, they might have taken a too uncritical attitude to-
wards the available evidence, they were epistemically lazy in not re-
viewing alternative explanations, and they might have been ignorant 
with respect to certain parts of the available evidence.
Psychological research into a “conspiracy mindset”, as well as philo-
sophical research into epistemological virtues and vices, can then pro-
fi le typical conspiracy theory believers and characterize their typical 
mistakes.
3 A similarly broad defi nition is defended in Dentith (2014).
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My suspicion is, though, that these familiar pitfalls of bad reasoning 
and bad epistemological practice will only partly explain the phenom-
enon of the rise of conspirational thought, at least for Western Europe. 
And I believe that this is also the area in which philosophy might gain 
new insights from studying this phenomenon.
In societies in which most of the media is clearly partisan, and 
where your main or only channels of information are one-sided and 
also unreliable, you may be lazy and end up with a largely mistaken 
picture of the world around you. The echo-chamber that will reinforce 
your mistaken beliefs is set up for you, and when you don’t make an 
effort to break out of it, you will remain having a world view that might 
be massively mistaken.
Fortunately, the relatively open societies of Western Europe are not 
like this. For the most part, the media are doing a pretty good job in 
providing accurate and relatively balanced information, they are also 
relatively independent, and from the way they are organized and man-
aged, not likely to get under external infl uence that could force the me-
dia to distort the information they are providing. In such a situation, 
being an epistemically lazy citizen of such a society does not automati-
cally lead to inaccurate beliefs. You actually need to do something, you 
need to fi nd alternative information sources in order to become mas-
sively misinformed.
And, strangely enough, this is what happens. The conspiracy theo-
ries that you fi nd in the comments section of your favourite news-out-
let have others found in the internet on specially dedicated blogs and 
websites, when looking exactly for this alternative account. The people 
writing these comments do not lazily believe what the mainstream me-
dia tell them, but go the extra mile and look up “information” that we 
safely ignore. After critically weighing the different accounts they then 
make up their own mind, and—tragically—end up with spectacularly 
false beliefs.
It is true that thanks to social media, like Facebook, people can now 
create their own echo chambers in which they only receive the informa-
tion that supports their world-view and beliefs, but not all conspiracy 
theorists confi ne their information intake to such echo chambers. In-
deed, those who post the weird comments under your favourite news 
outlet, must at least also consult that source. The picture of the lazy, 
gullible, ignorant conspiracy theorists (c.f. (Cassam 2016)) seems inap-
propriate for many cases.
This corresponds to the image that conspiracy theorists have of 
themselves. They are sceptics, they look at the information they re-
ceive via mainstream channels more critically than others and are en-
lightened and better informed than the average citizen (see Harambam 
(2017)). Indeed, the strategies they use in choosing the theory to believe 
are often consistent with recommended criteria for good explanations 
(which I already listed above), choose the theory that can explain more 
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aspects, choose a theory that is supported by more evidence, choose a 
theory that doesn’t postulate a great number of unlikely events.4 Of 
course, in the application of these criteria, mistakes are made, mis-
takes that are due to the fact that laypersons are often not in a good 
position to apply the appropriate criteria for theory choice.
I believe philosophy and epistemology in particular can gain from a 
better understanding of these mistakes, because it promises to lead to 
a better understanding of the general epistemological principles which 
philosophy tries to formulate.
Some of the mistakes are relatively easy to identify. Take for ex-
ample the standard cui bono heuristic that conspiracy theorists use in 
order to fi nd the conspiracy that caused the event they try to explain. 
Sometimes such a heuristic makes sense. Finding the culprit of, say, 
a murder by asking who would have had a motive, is a useful strat-
egy if you know that the event in question was murder; an intentional 
and planned killing. But you can’t just use this heuristic randomly for 
any event that you want to explain, since not every event is the result 
of successful intentional action. Here Popper’s argument against the 
conspiracy theory of society, that we encountered earlier in this pa-
per becomes now relevant for ordinary conspiracy theories. Using a cui 
bono heuristic without prior independent evidence that an event was 
indeed caused by intentional action relies on an unreasonable assump-
tion about the world and is thus irrational.
Other mistakes are not that easy to analyse. Conspiracy theorists 
often misidentify the relevant experts. They mistrust the proper sci-
entist, but put trust in charlatans. But how should they have known 
who the proper expert is, given that they themselves don’t know the 
relevant subject matter? What criteria can laymen use to determine 
whom they can trust? In social epistemology, this is discussed as the 
“Novice/2-Experts Problem”, a problem that will require a solution in 
terms of indirect indicators of relevant expertise (see Goldman (2001)). 
Such indicators that will have to be provided by trustworthy institu-
tions, such as universities, but these institutions are in the danger of 
losing public trust, and we need to understand why that is and what we 
can do to stop and reverse this development.
Finally, conspiracy theorists seem to suffer from a certain overcon-
fi dence in their own ability to inform themselves and arrive at a con-
sidered judgment over issues for which they don’t possess the relevant 
expertise. Again, it is diffi cult to blame them for this if epistemologists 
standardly recommend that the art of critical thinking requires the 
exercise of your own informed, critical judgment. Apparently, there is 
something wrong with the idea that we always should exercise our own 
best judgment. Sometimes it seems just prudent to trust the experts 
and to defer to their epistemic authority. When that’s so and whether 
4 The observation that conspiracy theories often seem to satisfy criteria for 
theory choice better than their competitors is also made in Hepfer (2015).
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such deference is compatible with the enlightenment ideal of epistemic 
autonomy is an open question that philosophers need to answer (see 
Zagzebski 2013)).
I hope that I have shown that conspiracy theories provide a fruitful 
test-case for philosophical theories and that philosophy is the relevant 
discipline to provide the normative analysis of the rise of conspirational 
thought in Western societies. How the normative analysis should then 
be translated into policies and strategies to address this dangerous 
phenomenon is, however, a question that philosophers, sociologists, 
psychologists and political scientists will have to solve together.
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